0. Constitutional Location of Lok Sabha Elections

Elections to Lok Sabha sit at the intersection of:

• Part V: Union (Articles 79 to 123, Parliament structure)

• Part XV – Elections: Articles 324 to 329A

• Key Articles:

  • Article 324 – Superintendence, direction and control of elections vested in the Election Commission of India (ECI).

  • Article 325 – One general electoral roll, no separate rolls on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex.

  • Article 326 – Elections to Lok Sabha and State Assemblies on basis of universal adult suffrage.

  • Article 327 – Parliament may make law on all matters relating to elections.

  • Article 329 – Bar on court interference in electoral matters, except via election petitions after elections.

• Statutory framework:

  • Representation of the People Act 1950 (RPA 1950) – Delimitation of constituencies, electoral rolls, allocation of seats.

  • Representation of the People Act 1951 (RPA 1951) – Conduct of elections, offences, disputes, qualifications and disqualifications.

With that frame, we can break the topic into the mandated subparts.

1. Direct Elections and Universal Adult Franchise

1.1 Constitutional Basis – Adult Suffrage and Single Electoral Roll

Article 326 – Adult Suffrage

Text in substance:

Elections to Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies shall be on the basis of adult suffrage; every citizen, not less than 18 years of age on the qualifying date and not otherwise disqualified (non residence, unsoundness of mind, crime, corrupt or illegal practice), shall be entitled to be registered as a voter.

Key features:

• Universal adult franchise from Day 1 of the Republic, unlike the gradual expansion in most Western democracies.

• No property, education or tax qualification.

• Disqualifications are limited and specified:

  • Non residence,

  • Unsoundness of mind,

  • Conviction for certain crimes or corrupt or illegal practices,

  • Any law made by appropriate legislature under Article 326.

61st Constitutional Amendment Act 1988:

• Reduced voting age from 21 to 18 years, effective from 28 March 1989.

• Objective: enlarge political participation, recognise maturity of youth, bring them earlier into the democratic process.

• Long term impact:

  • Massive numerical expansion of the electorate.

  • Youth centric politics and issues (jobs, education, reservation, identity politics) gain more weight.

Article 325 – Single General Electoral Roll

• Prohibits exclusion from electoral roll on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex.

• Rejects the colonial model of separate communal electorates, central to the demand for Pakistan.

• Instead: one common electoral roll per territorial constituency.

Together, Articles 325 and 326 embed the principles of political equality and inclusive citizenship as part of the basic democratic architecture.

1.2 Nature of the Right to Vote – Statutory or Fundamental?

Supreme Court’s position has evolved in a nuanced way:

1. N P Ponnuswami v Returning Officer (1952) and later Jyoti Basu v Debi Ghosal (1982)

   • Right to vote and right to contest are purely statutory rights, creatures of RPA, not fundamental rights.

2. PUCL line of cases – A more rights infused approach:

   a) Union of India v Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) (2002) and PUCL v Union of India (2003)

   • Court held that voter’s right to know criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities and educational qualifications of candidates is part of Article 19(1)(a) freedom of speech and expression.

   • Voting itself may be statutory, but information necessary to make that choice is constitutionally protected.

   b) PUCL v Union of India (2013) – NOTA case

   • Supreme Court directed ECI to provide “None of the Above” (NOTA) button on EVMs.

   • Held that secrecy in exercising even a negative vote is part of Article 19(1)(a) and the integrity of electoral process.

So the doctrinal position:

• Right to vote per se – Still characterised as statutory, flowing from RPA.

• Conditions that make that vote meaningful (information, secrecy, freedom of expression) – Protected by Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 and closely tied to the basic structure of free and fair elections.

For Mains, you should explicitly bring this duality: statutory right embedded in a constitutional environment of rights.

1.3 Democratic Significance of Universal Adult Franchise

Conceptually, universal adult franchise:

• Makes India a political democracy from the very beginning, not just a social and economic democracy in aspiration.

• Breaks from colonial attitudes that considered the masses unfit for self government.

• Functions as a corrective to social hierarchies: caste, gender, class.

• Has forced every national party to build broad based coalitions, particularly with marginalised groups.

From an exam perspective, link universal franchise to:

• Directive Principles (Articles 38, 39, 46) and

• Political equality in Preamble (Justice, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity).

2. Territorial Constituencies for Lok Sabha

2.1 Constitutional Foundations

Key provisions:

• Article 81 – Composition of Lok Sabha, allocation of seats to States and UTs.

• Article 82 – Readjustment of allocation of seats and delimitation after each Census.

• Article 327 – Parliament can legislate on all matters relating to elections including delimitation.

• Article 330 – Reservation of seats for SCs and STs in Lok Sabha.

• RPA 1950 – Provides concrete numbers of seats and defines parliamentary constituencies.

Lok Sabha is therefore elected from territorial constituencies created under RPA 1950, in conformity with Articles 81 and 82.

2.2 Single Member Territorial Constituencies

Basic features:

• India is divided into 543 single member territorial constituencies.

• Each constituency elects one MP by direct election.

• As far as practicable, each constituency within a State should have roughly equal population, subject to special treatment for reserved seats and geographical factors.

Rationale:

• Direct link between MP and a specific geographical area.

• Reduces complexity for a mostly first generation electorate.

• Fits with First Past The Post (FPTP) model (see later section).

2.3 Reservation of Constituencies for SCs and STs

• Article 330 – Certain constituencies are reserved for SC and ST candidates, but voters in those constituencies are all electors, not only SC/ST.

• This is territorial reservation, not separate electorates.

• Delimitation Commission identifies which constituencies are reserved, based on SC/ST population distribution.

Implications:

• Integrates SCs and STs into common political arena while ensuring minimum descriptive representation.

• Avoids communal roll based segregation that Article 325 prohibits.

3. Role of the Delimitation Commission

3.1 Constitutional and Statutory Basis

• Article 82 – Mandates Parliament to readjust allocation of seats and delimit constituencies after each Census.

• Article 170(3) – Similar provision for State Assembly constituencies.

• Parliament periodically enacts Delimitation Acts (1952, 1962, 1972, 2002) and sets up an independent Delimitation Commission under them.

Composition (under Delimitation Act 2002):

• A retired Supreme Court judge as Chairperson.

• Chief Election Commissioner or nominee.

• State Election Commissioners of the concerned States.

Nature:

• A quasi judicial, independent commission.

• Orders have force of law, not mere administrative instructions.

3.2 Functions of the Delimitation Commission

1. Readjustment of seats among States (when permitted by Constitution).

2. Delimitation of each constituency within States and UTs by:

   • Drawing boundaries respecting administrative units as far as possible.

   • Ensuring population equality as far as practicable.

3. Reservation mapping: deciding which constituencies are reserved for SC or ST, in proportion to their population in the State.

3.3 Legal Finality and Judicial Review

Key judgment: Meghraj Kothari v Delimitation Commission (1967)

• Issue: Challenge to delimitation orders under Delimitation Commission Act 1962.

• Holding:

  • Orders under sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act, when published, become law under Article 327.

  • By virtue of Article 329(a), such laws relating to delimitation cannot be questioned in any court.

• Effect: Delimitation orders are ordinarily immune from judicial review to prevent endless litigation and disruption of elections.

However, Supreme Court in later decisions has clarified that this is not an absolute bar:

• In cases like DMK v State of Tamil Nadu and recent 2024 bench observations, Court reiterated that while election process should not be stalled, gross constitutional violations, mala fide or arbitrariness could invite limited judicial review.

UPSC friendly formulation:

• General rule – Delimitation Commission orders are final and not justiciable.

• Exception – Extreme cases of violation of constitutional mandates may still be examined, but very rarely and usually not during the election schedule.

3.4 Freeze on Seat Readjustment and Political Controversy

Amendments:

1. 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1976

   • Froze readjustment of Lok Sabha and Assembly seats based on population at the 1971 Census until after the Census of 2001.

   • Objective: avoid penalising States that controlled population growth.

2. 84th Amendment Act 2001

   • Extended freeze on inter state seat allocation until the first Census after 2026.

   • Allowed only internal readjustment of constituency boundaries within States.

3. 87th Amendment Act 2003

   • Permitted delimitation of constituencies based on 2001 Census, but without changing the total number of seats per State.

Practical result:

• 543 seats remain distributed among States largely according to 1971 population, though the internal boundaries reflect 2001 data.

• This has led to emerging North South tensions:

  • High population growth States (UP, Bihar, Rajasthan etc) argue they are under represented today.

  • Southern and some North Eastern States fear losing relative influence if seats are reallocated strictly by updated population.

Future:

• After Census post 2026 and the lifting of freeze, a major boundary and seat re allocation exercise is expected, with huge federal and political implications.

4. First Past The Post (FPTP) System – Operation, Merits, Criticisms

4.1 What Exactly is FPTP in Indian Context

Definition:

• First Past The Post (FPTP) or simple plurality system – the candidate who gets more votes than any other candidate in a constituency is declared elected, even if not crossing 50 percent of valid votes.

In India:

• Used for Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections.

• Operationalised through:

  • Single member territorial constituencies (Article 81, RPA 1950).

  • RPA 1951 provisions on counting and declaration of result, where the candidate with the highest valid votes is returned.

Contrast within Indian system:

• Rajya Sabha, President, Vice President – elected by Proportional Representation, Single Transferable Vote.

• Lok Sabha and State Assemblies – elected by FPTP.

So, FPTP is a policy choice under RPA, not explicitly written as “FPTP” in the Constitution, but anchored through Articles 81 and 327.

4.2 Merits of FPTP – Why the Framers Chose It

1. Simplicity and clarity

   • Each voter chooses one candidate.

   • Counting is straightforward, results come quickly.

   • Particularly suitable for a largely illiterate and massive electorate at the time of independence.

2. Stable and decisive governments

   • FPTP tends to give seat bonuses to large parties or alliances.

   • Facilitates single party majority or stable coalitions in Lok Sabha, which is essential for a parliamentary executive.

   • Law Commission 170th Report acknowledged this stability advantage when it recommended retaining FPTP as the core system.

3. Strong local representative link

   • One MP is clearly accountable for a specific geographical area.

   • Enhances constituency service, grievance redressal and accessibility.

4. Barriers to extremist fragmentation

   • Threshold for winning may be low, but small fringe parties lacking concentrated support rarely win seats.

   • Encourages pre poll alliances, which can moderate extreme positions.

5. Less complexity, lower cost

   • Compared to Proportional Representation with party lists and multi member districts, FPTP is administratively easier and less prone to confusion in a poor, populous country.

For Prelims, you can summarise merits as: simplicity, stability, single representative, speed, familiarity.

4.3 Criticisms of FPTP – Distortions and Democratic Deficits

1. Disproportionate seat share vs vote share

   • National and State elections repeatedly show that a party with around 35 to 40 percent vote share can secure an absolute majority of seats.

   • Conversely, a party with 15 to 20 percent vote share distributed thinly may get very few seats.

   • This raises questions of majoritarian legitimacy – a government can control Lok Sabha without majority support among voters.

2. Wasted votes and lack of representation

   • All votes cast for losing candidates are effectively wasted.

   • Even votes above the minimum needed to win are wasted from a representation perspective.

   • Large sections of society, including minorities and dissenting groups, may remain perpetual minorities in the House.

3. Under representation of women and minorities

   • Parties often treat “winnability” in FPTP as linked to traditional social hierarchies and money muscle, which disadvantages women and marginalised communities.

   • Hence the move to reserve one third of seats for women through 106th Constitutional Amendment, even without changing FPTP.

4. Regional imbalances and identity polarisation

   • FPTP with single member constituencies may encourage ethnic or caste clustering of votes, sharpening social cleavages.

   • Parties focus on swing constituencies and neglect “safe” ones.

5. Encouragement of money and muscle power

   • When one seat is winner take all, stakes become very high.

   • This incentivises vote buying, resort politics, booth capture and criminalisation, which the Supreme Court and Law Commission have repeatedly flagged.

6. Discourages internal party democracy and dissent

   • Because candidate selection is central to winnability, central party leaderships and moneyed interests dominate ticket distribution, weakening grassroots democracy.

4.4 Alternatives and Reform Debates

• Law Commission 170th Report (1999):

  • Recommended a mixed system – keep existing 543 FPTP seats, add about 25 percent more seats (around 136) filled by Proportional Representation list system based on national vote shares, to correct distortions.

• NCRWC (Venkatachaliah Commission) also explored proportional or mixed systems, while recognising political and practical constraints.

• Policy think tanks and academic work increasingly question whether pure FPTP is appropriate for a highly plural, coalition era democracy.

No constitutional amendment has yet altered FPTP for Lok Sabha, but the debate is exam relevant for GS 2 and Essay.

5. Anti Defection Law and the Electoral Mandate

The user’s last sub topic is concept heavy, not purely factual. The key is to connect Tenth Schedule with representative democracy under FPTP.

5.1 Constitutional Text – Tenth Schedule

• Inserted by 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1985 as the Tenth Schedule, effective 15 February 1985.

• Amended by 91st Constitutional Amendment Act 2003 – strengthened anti defection, deleted “split” provision, added ministerial cap and bar on defectors becoming ministers.

Core provisions of Tenth Schedule:

• Para 2 – Disqualification on grounds of defection

  • Member of a House belonging to a political party is disqualified if:

    • (a) He or she voluntarily gives up membership of that political party; or

    • (b) Votes or abstains contrary to any whip or direction issued by the party on any vote, without prior permission and without condonation by party within 15 days.

  • An independent member is disqualified if he or she joins any party after election.

  • A nominated member is disqualified if he or she joins any party after six months of taking seat.

• Para 4 – Merger exception

  • No disqualification if original political party merges with another party and two thirds of the legislature party agree.

• Para 6 – Decision making authority

  • Speaker or Chairman of the House decides all questions of disqualification under Tenth Schedule.

• Para 7 – Bar of jurisdiction of courts

  • Originally ousted Judicial review of Speaker’s decisions; later partially struck down (see Kihoto Hollohan).

5.2 Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu (1992) – Constitutional Validity

• Challenge: Whether Tenth Schedule violates basic structure (democracy, judicial review, freedom of speech).

• Supreme Court ruling:

  • Upheld constitutional validity of Tenth Schedule in principle.

  • Held that defection is a serious evil and Parliament can curb it to protect stability of governments and respect for the electoral mandate.

  • However, Para 7, which completely barred judicial review, was held unconstitutional because it effectively amended jurisdiction of Supreme Court and High Courts without following Article 368 procedure.

  • Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review under Articles 32 and 226, although courts should generally interfere only after the Speaker has decided.

Thus:

• Anti defection law is a constitutionally valid restriction on individual legislator behaviour.

• But decisions under it cannot be placed entirely beyond constitutional courts.

5.3 Interpretation of “Voluntarily Giving Up Membership”

Key case: Ravi S. Naik v Union of India (1994)

• Court held that “voluntarily giving up membership” is wider than formal resignation.

• Membership may be deemed voluntarily given up if the conduct of the member demonstrates allegiance to another party or rebellion against the party line, even without formal resignation.

This expansive interpretation has allowed Speakers to disqualify MLAs/MPs who publicly support rival parties or participate in activities inconsistent with party membership, even if they technically remain members.

5.4 Splits, Mergers and the 91st Amendment

• Originally, Para 3 allowed exemption from disqualification in case of split where at least one third members of a legislature party defected together.

• This was heavily abused through “Aya Ram, Gaya Ram” politics.

• 91st Amendment (2003):

  • Deleted Para 3 (split exception).

  • Retained only merger exception (two thirds threshold) in Para 4.

  • Introduced an additional rule (Articles 75 and 164) that a person disqualified under Tenth Schedule cannot be appointed as Minister until re elected; also limited size of Council of Ministers to 15 percent of House strength.

Supreme Court in Jagjit Singh v State of Haryana (2006) interpreted merger provisions strictly and emphasised that merger must be in original political party, not just legislature party, to claim protection.

5.5 Speaker as Tribunal and Judicial Pressure

Supreme Court’s evolving line:

• Kihoto Hollohan – Speaker acts as a tribunal while deciding disqualification; decision subject to judicial review on limited grounds (mala fide, perversity, constitutional violation).

• Recent cases (Manipur, Maharashtra, Telangana, etc.) have criticised Speakers’ inaction and partisan delays and imposed time limits:

  • Supreme Court has:

    • Directed Speakers to decide petitions within 3 months, sometimes less.

    • Stressed that delay undermines democracy and constitutes abuse of constitutional trust.

    • Explicitly asked Parliament to re consider whether presiding officers should continue as adjudicators of defections.

Observation for Mains: there is a growing judicial and academic consensus that an independent tribunal (possibly headed by a retired judge) may better uphold neutrality in defection cases.

5.6 Anti Defection Law and Electoral Mandate – Analytical Link

The core tension is between two models of representation:

• Trustee or conscience representative – legislator free to vote based on judgment, even against party or constituent mood.

• Party delegate – legislator bound to party platform on which voters elected him or her.

Anti defection law privileges the party delegate model in the name of protecting electoral mandate.

Arguments that anti defection law protects electoral mandate

1. Mandate is for party manifesto and stable government

   • In FPTP, most voters choose between parties or alliances, not individual candidates.

   • Frequent defections can overturn governments mid term, betraying those who voted for a particular party or coalition.

   • Tenth Schedule curbs such post poll horse trading.

2. Enhances policy stability

   • Prevents governments from being held hostage by small groups of defectors.

   • Maintains collective responsibility and coherence of Cabinet in a parliamentary system.

Arguments that anti defection law distorts electoral mandate

1. Kills legislative deliberation and independence

   • Whip can be issued on almost any vote, not just confidence motions or budget.

   • MPs become “numbered heads”; they simply obey party bosses, undermining deliberative democracy and the representative’s conscience.

2. Concentrates power in party leadership

   • Candidate selection, ticket denial and threat of disqualification together give central leadership near absolute control over MPs and MLAs.

   • This may not reflect the local electorate’s wishes, especially in constituency specific issues.

3. Mis use of merger provisions

   • Large scale defections are sometimes engineered through manufactured “mergers” and delayed decisions by Speakers, making the law ineffective against big defections but harsh on small acts of principled dissent.

4. Inaction by Speakers subverts the law

   • Instead of promptly disqualifying defectors, Speakers often sit on petitions until political alignments stabilise.

   • Supreme Court has repeatedly had to intervene, which shows that institutional design is flawed.

Reform suggestions (important for GS 2 answers)

Eminent bodies like Law Commission, NCRWC, ECI and many scholars have suggested:

• Restrict anti defection disqualification to:

  • Confidence or no confidence motions,

  • Money Bills and Budget,

  • Maybe a few key constitutional amendments.

• On all other issues, allow free vote or at least a relaxed whip.

• Transfer adjudication from Speaker to an independent tribunal (possibly under ECI or headed by a retired judge).

• Provide statutory time limit (60 to 90 days) for deciding disqualification petitions.

• Strengthen inner party democracy so that whips reflect genuine ideological positions, not arbitrary high command dictates.

6. How to Use This Material for UPSC

6.1 For Prelims

You should be able to answer with precision:

• Exact Articles: 324 to 329A, 325, 326, 81, 82, 330, Tenth Schedule.

• Which elections use FPTP vs Proportional Representation.

• Age of voting before and after 61st Amendment.

• Basic structure of the Delimitation Commission, freeze under 42nd, 84th, 87th Amendments.

• Key features of Tenth Schedule, 52nd and 91st Amendments.

• Core holdings of Kihoto Hollohan, Ravi S Naik, Meghraj Kothari.

6.2 For Mains (GS 2, Essay)

You should be able to:

• Start from Part XV and Articles 325–326 while discussing universal adult franchise and elections to Lok Sabha.

• Analyse how territorial constituencies and FPTP shape party system, coalition politics, and representation.

• Critically evaluate FPTP using:

  • Law Commission and NCRWC recommendations,

  • Criminalisation and money power,

  • Women’s representation and pending Women’s Reservation Act.

• Link anti defection law to:

  • Stability vs inner party dissent,

  • Speaker’s partisanship and Supreme Court’s interventions,

  • Basic structure aspects of democracy and judicial review