Context (Latest Developments)
Historic Agreement & Continuing Talks: The WTO’s Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies was adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2022, marking a major step to curb harmful fishing subsidies However, it requires acceptance by two-thirds of WTO members to take effect, and as of April 2025, 97 WTO members (out of 164) have ratified it – still short of the 111 needed for entry into force. Negotiations are ongoing to broaden the pact.
MC13 Outcomes: At WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference (Feb–Mar 2024, Abu Dhabi), members failed to reach a deal on the second phase of fisheries subsidies rules. Talks on curbing subsidies that lead to overcapacity (e.g. for fuel, vessels) stalled amid divergences. The partial 2022 agreement (banning subsidies for IUU fishing and overfished stocks) was lauded as an important start, but members acknowledged that the most damaging subsidies – those driving overfishing and fleet overcapacity – remain to be disciplined.
India’s Recent Push: India has been front-and-center in advocating stronger rules, especially targeting subsidies for high seas (international waters) fishing by large distant-water fleets. In late 2024, India submitted proposals in Geneva urging strict disciplines on “historical” subsidizers engaged in distant-water (high seas) fishing, including a 25-year moratorium on any subsidy increases beyond their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). India highlighted stark inequalities – its support equals only $35 per fisher annually, versus up to $76,000 per fisher per year in some European nations. This call – backed by several developing countries like Indonesia – reflects concerns that massive subsidies by advanced economies on the high seas undermine sustainable fisheries and the livelihoods of small fishermen.
Ongoing Developments: As of May 2025, WTO members are working to build consensus on these outstanding issues. The WTO Director-General has identified concluding the “second wave” of fisheries subsidy rules and bringing the 2022 agreement into force as key priorities before the next Ministerial Conference.. India’s stance has become a focal point in talks, with debates pitting equity for developing nations’ fishing needs against the urgency of curbing subsidies that threaten global fish stocks.
Background: WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement
What It Is: The WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement is a new multilateral treaty aimed at stopping government subsidies that contribute to over-fishing and depletion of marine resources. Agreed at MC12 (Geneva, June 2022) after two decades of negotiations, it is the first WTO agreement with environmental sustainability at its core and directly aligns with UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.6 (eliminating harmful fishing subsidies). It addresses long-standing concerns that unchecked subsidies drive unsustainable fishing, undermine fair competition, and endanger the livelihoods of coastal communities.
Key Provisions: The agreement prohibits subsidies for:
- fishing by vessels engaged in IUU (Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated) fishing,
- fishing of overfished stocks, and
- fishing on the unregulated high seas (areas outside national jurisdiction or any regional management regime).
- It also mandates transparency – members must notify and report their fisheries subsidies, enabling monitoring.
- Crucially, negotiators left out subsidies contributing to overcapacity and over-fishing in general (such as boat construction, fuel subsidies, etc.) for a “phase two” of talksustr.gov. Members committed to continue negotiations on these outstanding issues to strengthen the disciplines.
Special Treatment: The agreement recognizes differing capacities. Developing countries (including India) and least-developed countries have a transition period (a “peace clause” of 2 years) during which they are exempt from dispute action on subsidies that would otherwise be prohibited. For example, subsidies to rebuild overfished stocks within a country’s EEZ are temporarily shielded. The treaty reaffirms countries’ UNCLOS rights to manage EEZ resources, while calling for future rules under the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and Special & Differential Treatment (S&DT) for developing members.
Ratification & Status: Unlike typical WTO agreements that apply by consensus, this deal requires two-thirds of members to ratify (formally accept) it to enter into force. That threshold (111 of the 164 WTO members) has not yet been met. The agreement will apply initially only to those who ratify, but all members are urged to join. Notably, it includes a sunset clause: if members fail to agree on additional subsidy disciplines (phase two) within 4 years of its entry-into-force, the current provisions will lapse unless extended, adding urgency to ongoing talks.
Key Facts about the Agreement
Adoption: Agreed on 17 June 2022 at WTO MC12 in Geneva, after 21 years of negotiations. It was a rare success in global trade talks, clinched by consensus of all WTO members.
Objective: To curb “harmful fisheries subsidies” – government support that incentivizes over-exploitation of fish stocks – in order to protect ocean ecosystems and fishing livelihoods. It is seen as a trade measure supporting environmental sustainability (balancing WTO’s trade rules with global conservation goals).
Core Prohibitions:
No subsidies for IUU fishing – Governments must stop subsidizing vessels or operators engaged in illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing.
No subsidies for overfished stocks – If a fish population is overfished (depleted), subsidies that would further increase fishing of that stock are banned.
No subsidies for unregulated high seas fishing – Subsidies cannot support fishing on the high seas outside of any recognized regional fisheries management arrangement.
Transparency: Members must notify the WTO about the nature and extent of their fisheries subsidies and provide information (e.g. fleet statistics, fish stock status) – enhancing transparency and peer review
Ratification Progress: The agreement will take effect once two-thirds of WTO members (111 out of 164) ratify it. As of early 2025, about 97 members have done so– ~87% of the required target – including major fishing nations like the US and China. India and several others have not yet ratified, citing pending concerns and awaiting further negotiations.
Next Phase Talks: WTO members are in a “second wave” of negotiations to extend the rules to subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing (e.g. fuel subsidies, vessel construction aids, etc.). The aim is to agree on these additional disciplines by the next Ministerial Conference (MC14). Until then, the current agreement’s disciplines are narrower in scope, addressing the “worst forms” of subsidies first.
Key Concepts Involved
Fisheries Subsidies: Financial support by governments to the fishing sector – e.g. grants for boat building, fuel subsidies, tax exemptions, price support – intended to promote fishing. While they can support fisher livelihoods, harmful subsidies lower the cost of fishing and can lead to overcapacity (too many boats) and overfishing (excess catch beyond sustainable limits).
Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Fishing activities that violate laws (illegal), are not reported to authorities, or occur in areas with no management rules (unregulated). IUU fishing undermines stock assessments and conservation measures. The WTO pact targets subsidies to IUU fishing as these funds effectively abet law-breaking and resource depletion.
Overfished Stock: A fish stock that is depleted or over-exploited – its population is below a sustainable level due to past overfishing. Subsidizing catch from an overfished stock can impede its recovery, hence the agreement’s ban on such subsidies. (Example: If Indian Ocean tuna or Atlantic cod are overfished, members cannot subsidize vessels to catch more of those.)
High Seas: Ocean areas beyond any country’s national jurisdiction (i.e. beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone limit of 200 nautical miles from shore). The high seas are a global commons for fisheries, regulated only by multinational agreements. High Seas Fishing is mostly done by a few nations’ large fleets, often heavily subsidized. The new WTO rules ban subsidies for high-seas fishing unless under a management pact, and India is pushing for even stricter curbs on these subsidies.
Distant-Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs): Countries whose fishing fleets operate far from their own waters, including on the high seas or in other countries’ EEZs (via access agreements). Examples include China, EU nations, Japan, South Korea, and others with large industrial fleets. India’s proposals single out DWFNs for tougher disciplines, as their subsidies have global impact.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A sea zone up to 200 nm from a coastal state’s baseline, where that state has sovereign rights to marine resources (fishing, oil, etc.). Countries manage fisheries in their EEZs. WTO talks debate different rules for subsidies inside one’s EEZ (sovereign waters) versus on the high seas. India insists on the freedom to support its small fishers within its EEZ, while calling for limits on others subsidizing beyond their own waters.
Special & Differential Treatment (S&DT): A WTO principle granting developing countries flexibility or longer timelines in implementing agreements. In this context, S&DT means exemptions or grace periods for poorer nations’ fishing subsidies, recognizing their dependence on small-scale fisheries for livelihoods. India advocates robust S&DT so that rules don’t unfairly burden developing nations’ food security.
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR): An environmental governance principle (from Rio Earth Summit 1992) that all states are responsible for sustainable use of resources, but not equally responsible – those who contributed more to a problem (or have greater capacity) should bear a larger burden in solving it. India invokes CBDR in WTO fisheries talks, arguing that historically high subsidizers (developed nations) should make deeper cuts, while developing states with minimal per-capita subsidies require leniency.
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the legal framework for ocean use (including defining EEZs and high seas). WTO negotiators reference UNCLOS to ensure that new subsidy rules respect coastal states’ rights to manage their EEZ resources.
Significance of the Agreement
Sustainable Fisheries & Ocean Health: The agreement is seen as crucial for global marine conservation. By tackling subsidies that encourage overfishing, it addresses a root cause of declining fish populations. This is vital for restoring ocean health and biodiversity – without curbing subsidies, even well-intended conservation efforts can be undermined by artificially propped-up fishing effort. It is a trade measure directly supporting environmental sustainability, an embodiment of SDG 14’s call to end harmful fishing subsidies.
First-of-its-Kind Trade Deal: It is the first multilateral trade agreement focused on the environment. This sets a precedent for the WTO addressing global commons issues. It demonstrates that trade rules can incorporate sustainability goals – a breakthrough after 20+ years of talks. The deal’s success (once in force) could bolster the WTO’s credibility and pave the way for agreements on other environmental challenges (like climate-related subsidies).
Protecting Livelihoods and Food Security: Curbing harmful subsidies will help level the playing field for millions of artisanal and small-scale fishers in developing countries. These communities suffer when industrial fleets – often foreign or heavily subsidized – deplete local fish stocks. By disciplining big subsidizers, the agreement can safeguard coastal livelihoods and ensure fish as a source of protein remains available for local populations. For India, with ~9 million fishermen, this is directly tied to socio-economic welfare and food security.
Addressing Global Inequities: The current subsidy regime is highly skewed – roughly $35 billion is spent annually on fisheries subsidies worldwide, but a handful of rich nations account for the bulk of this (China, EU, US, South Korea, Japan). The agreement pushes for more equitable practices: those who can afford massive subsidies and have distant fleets will face stricter rules, which is significant for global justice in resource use. India’s highlighting of “subsidy per fisher” disparities (just $35 in India vs tens of thousands in developed nations) has underscored this inequity.
Curbing IUU Fishing & Crimes: By eliminating subsidies to IUU fishing, the agreement can indirectly help combat organized illegal fishing and associated crimes (smuggling, forced labor at sea, etc.). Many IUU operators thrive on government support; removing it makes their operations less viable This has a positive security and governance impact on international waters and coastal zones plagued by illegal fishing.
Multilateral Cooperation: In an era of rising unilateralism, this agreement (if fully realized) represents a collective multilateral solution to a transboundary problem. It shows global cooperation for the common good – preserving fisheries for future generations – and reinforces the role of institutions like the WTO in solving beyond-trade issues.
India’s Stand and Concerns
Support for Artisanal Fishers: India has firmly stated it will not accept rules that undermine its ability to support small and traditional fishermen. At WTO forums, India opposes any blanket curbs on subsidies that its government gives for livelihood and security of poor fishers operating in its own waters. New Delhi insists that developing countries must retain policy space to assist subsistence-level and small-scale fishing communities.
25-Year Moratorium on High Seas Subsidies: India’s flagship proposal is that advanced economies with large industrial fleets should impose a 25-year moratorium on subsidies for fishing in international waters. In other words, big players like the EU, US, China, Japan, etc. should freeze or reduce their high-seas fishing subsidies for the next quarter-century. This would prevent further depletion of fish stocks on the high seas and give coastal developing nations time to build their own capacities. India has argued that nations which historically depleted ocean resources should “shoulder a greater share of responsibility” for recovery.
“Polluter Pays” and Fairness: Indian negotiators emphasize equity – those who contributed most to overfishing must do more to fix it. India advocates principles like CBDR and the polluter pays principle in the WTO context. Concretely, India demands that historical subsidizers (chiefly developed countries and big distant-water fishing nations) face tougher disciplines, whereas developing countries with minimal per-capita subsidies get leeway. For example, India points out it spends a tiny amount per fisher (₹ subsidy per capita) compared to huge subsidies per fisher in Europe. This metric, India suggests, should guide fairness in subsidy cuts.
Sovereign Rights in EEZ: India insists on protecting its sovereignty to manage fisheries in its EEZ. Citing UNCLOS, India argues WTO rules must not constrain a coastal nation’s right to utilize marine resources for its people. Thus, India seeks exemption or relaxed rules for subsidies given within 200 nm (national waters), especially for developing countries. Indian officials have said that its fishers should be able to receive subsidies when fishing in sovereign waters, without strict limits– because those subsidies are tied to domestic food and livelihood needs, not global overfishing.
Including Fuel and Access Agreements: Another element of India’s stand is to broaden what is covered. India wants fuel subsidies (often given as cheap diesel to fishing boats) and government-to-government fishery access agreements (where rich nations pay for fishing rights in poor countries’ waters) to be counted and disciplined. These were not fully addressed in the initial agreement. By bringing these into the ambit, India aims to close loopholes that allow large fleets to continue harmful fishing under different guises.
Not Stalling but Strengthening: India has bristled at accusations that it is obstructing a deal. In late 2024, when talks missed a deadline, some developed members blamed India for revisiting settled issues. India countered that it is pushing for a stronger agreement – one that truly tackles unsustainable subsidies – rather than a weak compromise. An Indian official remarked that blaming India for the impasse was “merely an excuse…to push for weak disciplines, allowing business as usual to continue”. India has garnered support from many developing countries (e.g. the Africa Group, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) who share concerns that stringent rules must apply to big subsidizers first, and that developing nations’ needs be acknowledged.
Current Status – Awaiting Balance: As of 2025, India has not yet ratified the 2022 fisheries agreement. Officials indicated India may consider ratification after seeing progress on its concerns (and also likely after its 2024 general elections). In essence, India’s support for the multilateral deal is tied to assurance that the final outcome will be equitable and will not handicap its small-scale fishers. India’s stance can be summed up as seeking “pragmatic flexibility for developing nations, and stricter accountability for advanced distant-water fishing nations.”
Issues and Challenges
Developed vs Developing Divide: A fundamental rift persists – developing countries led by India demand differentiated responsibilities, whereas some developed members push for uniform rules. India’s call to let itself and other developing nations maintain subsidies for 25 years (inside EEZs) while asking developed nations to immediately halt their high-seas subsidies has met resistance. Critics (e.g. the EU) argue that one-sided obligations won’t work: “we will never succeed if one seeks disciplines to apply to others but exemptions for oneself,” the EU ambassador warned. Squaring the circle between equity and uniform sustainability rules is a core challenge.
Major Subsidizers’ Reluctance: Countries with large fishing subsidies (China, EU, US, Japan, etc.) are wary of committing to deep subsidy cuts that could hurt their fleets and industry jobs. For instance, China – which has about 1/3 of the world’s fishing vessels – was unwilling to accept language that outright banned subsidies for distant-water (deep sea) fishing. Many of these nations defend some subsidies as important for food security or strategic industry support. Gaining their agreement to new limits (especially while they see others asking for exemptions) has proven difficult.
High Seas Governance Complexity: Regulating fishing on the high seas is inherently tricky – there’s no single authority, and not all areas or stocks are covered by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Subsidy rules on high-seas fishing require trust and cooperation. Enforcement is a concern: even if WTO bans such subsidies, monitoring whether, say, a fuel subsidy is used for high-seas fishing vs coastal fishing can be complex. Without strong transparency and data sharing, enforcement gaps could undermine the rules.
Measuring Fairness: How to define and measure “harmful” subsidies in a fair way is debated. India suggests metrics like per capita subsidy or subsidy intensity relative to fishers and coastline, whereas the current approach looks at aggregate subsidy amounts. Some small countries (e.g. Pacific Island states) argue that any subsidies for distant-water fleets are harmful to them and must be eliminated, aligning with conservation groups. Others argue that capacity-building subsidies in poor nations (for boats, gear) should be allowed even if they technically increase fishing effort. Achieving a formula that distinguishes “good” vs “bad” subsidies, accounting for different contexts, is a major challenge.
Continuing IUU and Compliance Issues: Even with the agreement, IUU fishing remains rampant. Ensuring all countries actually withdraw subsidies from IUU vessels requires robust monitoring. Some countries may lack capacity to track which vessels are IUU-listed. There’s also the risk that without universal adherence (since not all members have ratified yet), IUU fleets might re-flag to non-ratifying countries to dodge rules. Effective implementation will need capacity building and cooperation (e.g. sharing vessel blacklists).
Delay and Lapse Risk: The slow pace of ratifications and negotiations means a risk that momentum falters. If the agreement doesn’t enter into force relatively soon, or if phase-two talks drag on without result, the credibility of the WTO in delivering on environmental goods could suffer. Moreover, the built-in 4-year lapse clause adds pressure – failure to agree on the broader disciplines in time could nullify even the hard-won 2022 provisions. This puts the spotlight on reaching consensus by around 2025–2026, a tight timeline given the complexity and the political sensitivities (especially in an election cycle for key countries).
External Factors: Geopolitical tensions and domestic politics can spill into the negotiations. For example, India (with elections in 2024) and the US (with domestic pressure to address forced labor in fishing) both came to MC13 with limited flexibility External conflicts (Ukraine war, etc.) also distract political capital. Keeping the focus and trust in talks despite these headwinds is challenging. Additionally, aligning the WTO outcome with other forums (like aligning with the new UN High Seas Treaty 2023 for marine biodiversity) will be important but requires cross-sector coordination.
Global and Indian Initiatives
Global Initiatives: The WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement itself stems from a global mandate – the UN SDG Target 14.6, which called for eliminating subsidies that contribute to overfishing and IUU by 2020. Beyond the WTO, various Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) (e.g. Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, ICCAT for Atlantic tuna) have rules to cap catches and could benefit from complementary subsidy reforms. In 2023, countries also concluded a High Seas Treaty (BBNJ Agreement) under the UN to protect marine biodiversity in international waters – this, along with the WTO rules, will bolster oversight of high seas activities. Additionally, organizations like the FAO and environmental groups (e.g. Pew Charitable Trusts, WWF) are working with governments to provide data, technical support, and advocacy to reduce harmful subsidies and promote sustainable fishing practices globally.
India’s National Initiatives: In parallel with its WTO stance, India has taken steps to support sustainable fisheries domestically:
Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY): Launched in 2020 as part of the Blue Revolution, this flagship scheme invests in modernizing the fisheries sector with a focus on sustainability and value addition. Funds are provided for fishery infrastructure, aquaculture, conservation measures, and welfare of fishers. While it is a subsidy program, it emphasizes improved productivity and resource management (e.g. promoting sea ranching, regulated fishing seasons) to ensure long-term viability of fish stocks.
Regulatory Measures: India enforces seasonal fishing bans (e.g. a monsoon ban period along coasts) to allow fish breeding, and regulates mesh size of nets to prevent juvenile catch. The government has prepared the Draft Indian Marine Fisheries Bill, 2021 to update laws governing fishing in India’s EEZ – aiming to strengthen oversight, curb IUU fishing, and protect the rights of traditional fishers. This would align domestic law with global best practices and improve monitoring of India’s distant-water fishing vessels as well.
Capacity Building: Through agencies like the Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA) and coastal state governments, India is training fishers in sustainable practices (such as avoiding destructive gear, using tracking systems). Community-led initiatives (with NGOs) are being encouraged for reef conservation and restoring fish habitats. Such steps help ensure any subsidy given (e.g. for new boats or fuel) is paired with responsibilities like adhering to catch limits.
International Cooperation: India is part of regional bodies (IORA – Indian Ocean Rim Association, BOBP-IGO – Bay of Bengal Programme) where it cooperates on fisheries management. It has been working with neighboring countries to combat IUU fishing (for instance, information-sharing on vessels). These cooperative efforts complement the WTO negotiations by addressing the problem on multiple fronts – from local waters to the high seas.
Way Forward
Fast-Track Ratification: A top priority is to bring the 2022 agreement into force. All WTO members, especially major fishing nations that haven’t ratified (including India), should be encouraged to submit their acceptance. Swift ratification by the remaining countries will not only activate the current rules (immediately curbing IUU and overfished stock subsidies) but also build confidence for the next negotiation phase. International organizations and advocacy groups are urging members to “finish the race” and not lose the momentum.
Conclude “Phase Two” Negotiations: Members need to strike a balanced deal on overcapacity and overfishing subsidies. This will likely require creative compromises – for instance, setting subsidy caps or reduction commitments that are graduated (higher cuts for high-subsidizers, minimal cuts for low-subsidizers), or criteria like subsidy per vessel. A possible way forward is to adopt India’s idea of focusing on subsidy intensity and per capita impact, so that small-scale support in poor nations isn’t equated with large-scale subsidies elsewhere. Time-bound exemptions (longer transition for developing countries) coupled with clear end-goals could bridge differences. The aim should be to finalize these disciplines by MC14 (expected in 2025) to meet the treaty’s timeline and global expectations.
Address Core Concerns – Equity and Sustainability: The package must satisfy both sustainability objectives and fairness. This means developed countries should demonstrate leadership by phasing out the most egregious subsidies (like fuel subsidies for distant fleets) as soon as possible, living up to the “polluter pays” principle. Developing countries, on their part, can commit to enhancing regulation of their fisheries and gradually improving subsidy targeting (ensuring subsidies are for sustainability improvements or livelihood support, not capacity expansion). By incorporating Special & Differential Treatment that is meaningful (e.g. technical assistance, longer phase-in for rules, and perhaps a funding mechanism for artisanal fishers), the final agreement can ensure no one is left behind.
Enhance Transparency & Monitoring: A robust monitoring system will be key to the agreement’s success. Members should invest in better fisheries data collection – stock assessments, subsidy notification systems, vessel tracking – and share this information. The WTO could work with FAO and RFMOs to create a transparent database of subsidies and fishing activities. Regular reviews of implementation (perhaps a dedicated WTO Fisheries Committee) can help identify non-compliance or needed adjustments. Monitoring will also build trust that all sides are adhering to their commitments, thereby facilitating continued cooperation.
Support and Capacity Building: The global community should support developing countries in adjusting to the new rules. This could include a fund or technical assistance program to help countries repurpose subsidies towards conservation-oriented activities (like fishery management, habitat restoration, aquaculture) and to develop alternative livelihoods for fishing communities if needed. Investing in improving artisanal fishing infrastructure (better boats, cold storage, local markets) can achieve the dual goal of improving livelihoods without simply increasing fishing effort. Such flanking measures will make it easier for countries like India to sign on to stringent rules, knowing their small fishers will get support during the transition.
Political Will and Leadership: Finally, high-level political impetus is required. Leaders of major fishing nations must prioritize this issue – treating it not just as a trade negotiation, but as a planetary imperative. A success on fisheries subsidies will demonstrate that multilateralism can deliver win-win outcomes for trade, development, and the environment. India, with its large stake and vocal advocacy, can play a leadership role for the Global South by working constructively with others (possibly crafting an alliance or coalition for sustainable fishing). By MC14, a convergence built on mutual trust – where each side concedes a bit (developed cutting subsidies, developing accepting some limits) – is the way forward to ensure healthy oceans and thriving fishing communities for generations to come.
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